<u>Prologue: Pakistan's Broken Identity</u> Secular vs. Islamic Governance

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Introduction

Although Islam is the most followed religion in Pakistan, the representation of religion is distorted, and the laws of the nation are scrambled between secular law and the Sharī'ah of Allah . To better understand Pakistan's notion of 'identity', or as the article is titled – "broken identity", I will analyze a few major causes of this current crisis faced by the Muslim majority state. This paper will serve as a prologue to a series of articles that begins with highlighting Pakistan's conflicting position of adopting both secular and religious governance.

Here in the West, we are accustomed to seeing secularism flaunted across many, if not all, areas of politics and the public institutions of a state. George Jacob Holyaoke, an English social reformist, coined the term 'secularism' in 1851. Holyoake's initial conception of secularism emphasized a focus on human well-being without relying on religious doctrines. However, he did not advocate for atheism but rather for a public life and morality independent of religious influence. Holyoake's interpretation of "secularism is the doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or a future state".

Earlier philosophers like John Locke and Thomas Jefferson outlined their ideas more explicitly for the separation of the Church and the State. Both Locke and Jefferson advocated for secularism as a means to protect individual liberty, prevent religious persecution, and foster a society where diverse beliefs could coexist peacefully under a neutral government. Their ideas shaped the constitutional frameworks of their respective nations and have had a lasting impact on the development of secular societies.

However, it didn't just stop there in the West. The spread of secularism has mutated in many forms across the globe, to which states have been uncontrollably affected. Coming to more recent times, online debates and podcasts on societal issues have risen with no exception to the discussion on Pakistan's broken identity. The late Mawlana Abu'l Ala' Mawdudi and Dr. Israr Ahmed, and more recently, Khalid Mehmood Abbasi, Sahil Adeem, and many others have effectively put pen to paper on this issue bringing the systemic and ideological issues of the country to light and exposing corruption on a much wider platform compared to the past.

To put it bluntly, foreign affairs and regional instability have instigated corruption in Pakistan to an unprecedented level that has left the country in a politically unstable environment insomuch that the Pakistani identity is nothing less comparable to muddy waters. The Afghan Soviet War, the US War on Terror, continued tensions with India, dependency on China's economic

influence, and the Saudi-Iran rivalry are some of the major geopolitical tensions that have caused an increased sentiment of secularism with an equal and opposite intensity towards Islamic orthodoxy. This is because Pakistan's politicians in power have blindly bowed to geopolitical deals that benefit their assets and legacy. The weak "buy-in" nature of Pakistan has caused this broken identity. On the one hand, having to accommodate 'forced' secularism to keep foreign aid flowing, while on the other hand, showcasing a religious governing attitude for domestic affairs to keep the sentiments of an 'Islamic' republic alive. This paper will elaborate on these examples further and highlight why having this imbalanced identity is creating long term systemic polarity that is becoming harder to resolve.

The Sharī'ah of Allah 48

Now, the term "Sharī'ah" refers to a comprehensive framework upon "the correct path." In linguistic terms, Sharī'ah means "a non-exhaustive source of water with which people and animals satisfy their thirst"ⁱⁱ. In its technical form, it is defined as "the revealed or canonical laws of Islam"ⁱⁱⁱ. It is the divinely ordained guidance that embodies legal, moral and ethical principles of life emanating from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. For Muslims, Sharī'ah law is not just a legal system—it is a way of life that provides spiritual, moral, and social direction. It aims to create a just, ethical, and God-conscious society, helping individuals achieve success in both this life and the Hereafter.

Allah * refers to this concept in Sūrah al-Jāthiyah:

[Al Jāthiyah 45:18] - Then We put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained way ("a Sha'riah") concerning the matter [of religion]; so, follow it and do not follow the inclinations of those who do not know.

During its inception, the principles of partition for Pakistan were intrinsically based on the notion of a 'Muslim State.' However, the forefathers of Pakistan's independence (namely the Muslim League Political Party) fought the race with a nationalist propaganda in mind that deviates quite evidently from the concept of an 'Islamic State' or a 'Khilāfah', which had officially dismembered a couple of decades prior in 1924. This nationalist propaganda that was fully supported by their Western colonizers ensured early on that Pakistan would never be able to firmly ground an identity of the claimed Islamic state. So much so, that the only party allowed to successfully promote independence was a nationalist one parading as an Islamic Party^{iv}. Thus, the British Raj implemented their 'divide and conquer' strategy; one that has until today diminished the prospects of an established identity for Pakistan as an Islamic State governing under Islamic law.

And presently, the political and social order in Pakistan is antithetical to the framework of the divine Sharī'ah more than it has ever been. Let us analyze some of the contradictory social movements and political ideals that have disrupted Pakistan's identity and highlight why the alternative framework of an Islamic system is most appropriate despite the extensive political shifts required.

Identity Crisis - Domestic Politics

It is a well-known matter that amongst the political instability in Pakistan, one factor that remained constant is the constitutional commitment to the slogan of "Islam". However, the legal corpus has only accommodated matters of Islamic law that serve the interests of politicians in power, rather than any wider intention of adhering to the comprehensive Sharī ah and creating a true Khilāfah system. For example, the concept of Zakāt is practiced across the country with the encouragement of governing bodies, but only in a limited capacity. The public's distrust of Zakāt institutions and state authorities that manage them has negatively impacted its full potential for wealth circulation and its corresponding economic benefit. Estimates suggest that if Zakāt were collected to its full potential, it could amount to approximately 4% of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This substantial figure indicates Zakāt's capacity to influence economic dynamics positively amidst falling real wages, rising inflation, and a poverty rate of 40.5% as of 2024vii.

Many attempts have been made in the past by serving members of government to initiate a more rigorous approach to Islamic governance. The focus of "Islamization" in the legal system was notably established by the Zia-ul-Haq regime during 1978-1988viii. As expected, public sentiment towards this move was deeply divided. While conservative and religious segments, particularly in rural areas, welcomed his efforts to align governance with Islamic principles, many urban liberals, intellectuals, women's rights activists, and minority groups criticized the regime for using religion to justify authoritarian rule. The 'Hudood Ordinances'ix and discriminatory legal reforms sparked widespread protests, especially from women's organizations like the Women's Action Forum. Over time, growing censorship, sectarian tension, and civil rights violations led to increasing disillusionment, leaving Zia's Islamization a controversial and polarizing legacy in Pakistan's history.^x

Caught Between Tradition and Modernity

In the last 78 years of its independence, the earlier generations have been rooted to the ideology of residing in an 'Islamic Republic.' However, generations following on from the early 90s have been tackling a crisis of rising democratic practices and regulations along with this mere concept of an "Islamic republic". The young population today is scrambling between a lack of Islamic knowledge and increased liberal practices showing precedence in nearly all matters of politics and day to day life. For example, faculties of secular ethics are growing across universities and colleges, the education system at large is adopting a westernized curriculum, co-education of

genders is normalized in schools, women's rights activism fueled by Western feminism is rising (i.e. Aurat March), and the list goes on. While one would expect a largely Muslim population to resist and purge these foreign influences, a large chunk of the population (especially those considered "educated") are accepting this importation of values with open arms. It is for this reason that our *Deen* emphasizes the obligation of seeking basic knowledge that engraves the creed and practices of Islam in our hearts; for knowledge is the light that demarcates the truth from falsehood with certainty until our limbs act upon its guidance. The Prophet said on the authority of the companion, Anas ibn Mālik:

طَلَبُ الْعِلْمِ فَرِيضَةٌ عَلَى كُلِّ مُسْلِمٍ "Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim."

Sunan Ibn Mājah 224

Lack of Unity

Another major contributing factor to a broken identity is the lack of unity amongst the Muslims within Pakistan. Although between 80-90% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam^{xi}, there has been a great deal of separatist movements, uprisings, and economic grievances for many years across the 4 provinces. Provinces such as Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) often emphasize their distinct identities, occasionally prioritizing them over a unified Islamic identity. This emphasis is partly a reaction to Punjab's perceived dominance in political and economic spheres, leading to feelings of marginalization among smaller provinces. The absence of an inclusive Islamic judicial system that embraces this diversity has hindered efforts to solidify Pakistan as a cohesive nation (even if by the sub-standards of a secular republic let alone a true Islamic state).

Economic disparities further exacerbate these divisions. Punjab's control over significant resources, including water and industry, has led to grievances in provinces like Sindh and Balochistan. Despite Karachi's substantial contribution to national revenue, Sindh alleges inequitable federal allocation of funds and benefits for development schemes^{xii}. Similarly, Balochistan's rich natural resources contrast starkly with its underdevelopment, fueling separatist sentiments. These economic inequalities violate the Islamic principles of justice and equity, underscoring the need for governance that genuinely embodies these latter values to foster lasting ideological unity.

Cultivating unity and repelling divisive forces were central to the Prophetic development of the Madinan state. For example, the Prophet admonished the *Muhājirīn* and the *Anṣār* when they proclaimed their tribal calls of protection from the days of pre-Islamic ignorance. The companion, Jābir ibn 'Abdullāh (may Allah be pleased with him) narrated below when the hypocrites tried to create discord between the Muslims during the expedition of Banū al-Muṣṭaliq (6 AH):

We were in a Ghazwa (expedition) and a man from the emigrants kicked an Ansari (on the back with his foot). The Ansari man said, "O the Ansari! (Help!)" The emigrant said, "O the emigrants! (Help)." When Allah's Messenger (*) heard that, he said, "What is that?" They said, "A man from the emigrants kicked a man from the Ansar (on the buttocks his foot). On that the Ansar said, 'O the Ansar!' and the emigrant said, 'O the emigrants!" The Prophet (*) said' "Leave it (i.e. call of tribalism) for it is a rotten thing." The number of Ansar was larger (than that of the emigrants) at the time when the Prophet (*) came to Medina, but later the number of emigrants increased. `Abdullah bin Ubai said, "Have they, (the emigrants) done so? By Allah, if we return to Medina, surely, the more honorable will expel therefrom the meaner," `Umar bin Al-Khattab said, "O Allah's Messenger (*)! Let me chop off the head of this hypocrite!" The Prophet said, "Leave him, lest the people say Muhammad kills his companions:"

Sahīh al-Bukhārī 4907 - Sahīh Muslim 2584

Note, the Islamic definition of tribalism can be summarized (and extended to modern forms of nationalism, patriotism, and other fragile human bonds) from the narration of Wathīlah ibn al-Asqā' who reported that:

I said, "O Messenger of Allah, is it part of tribalism that a man loves his people?" The Prophet # said:

"No, rather it is tribalism that he supports his people in wrongdoing."

Sunan Ibn Mājah 3949

Foreign Hands in Domestic Affairs

Pakistan's fragile foundation of independence meant that shifting global affairs almost always had a negative impact on Pakistan's stability apart from growing relations with China (which have been primarily advantageous for its economy). Regionally, the tensions with its bordering states of India, Iran and Afghanistan, and globally, the hegemonic pressure of the UK and the US has exacerbated secularism in more than one way. Not only by promoting liberal secular values—but by weakening the country's ability to define and implement a coherent Islamic identity. Regional tensions have compelled Pakistan to adopt a security-centric model, prioritizing military and territorial interests, and thereby pushing Pakistan towards pragmatic alliances and power politics while any calls for *Ummatic* efforts remain as hollow slogans. Instead of enacting Islamic solutions, their self-preservation tactics meant cooperating with non-Muslim powers against neighboring Muslim countries or causes, undermining the pan-Islamic ideals upon which the country was theoretically conceived^{xiii}. Such is the devastation of secular policies—causing corruption while being deprived of divine support. Allah ** says:

وَ الَّذِينَ كَفَر وِ ا بَعِضُهُم أَو لِياعُ بَعِض ۚ الَّا تَفْعَلُو هُ تَكُن فَتَنَّةٌ فِي الأَرْضِ وَ فَسادٌ كَبِيرٌ

[Al Anfāl 8:73] - And those who disbelieve. they are allies of one another; and unless you act likewise. there will be oppression in the world and great corruption.

لا يَتَّخِذِ المُؤمِنونَ الْكُفِرِينَ أُولِياءَ مِن دونِ المُؤمِنينَ ۖ وَمَن يَفْعَل ذُٰلِكَ فَلَيسَ مِنَ اللَهِ فَى شَىءٍ إِلّا أَن تَتَّقُوا مِنْهُم تُقَلَّهُ ۗ وَيُحَذِّرُكُمُ اللَّهُ نَفْسَهُ ۗ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ الْمَصيرُ

[Āle 'Imrān 3:28] - The believers may not take the unbelievers as their allies in preference to those who believe. Whoever does this has nothing to do with Allah unless he does so in order to protect himself from their wrong-doing. Allah warns you to beware of Him for it is to Allah that you will return.

Globally, hegemonic pressures—first from the UK during colonial rule and later from the US—have entrenched secular frameworks within Pakistan's institutions. The British colonial administration left behind a legal and bureaucratic structure that was largely secular, creating obstacles to the implementation of Islamic jurisprudence in post-independence governance. During the Cold War and post-9/11, U.S. influence reinforced a secular military elite, aligning Pakistan's policies specifically with Western strategic objectives. Programs tied to foreign aid, such as educational reform and counterterrorism efforts, often came with conditions that marginalized Islamic political expression and suppressed movements advocating for Islamic governance^{xiv}. This form of imposed secularism, born of global and regional insecurity, has displaced any calls of a just and representative Islamic system in Pakistan, weakening the country's ideological foundation and deepening its identity crisis.

Now, some would argue that global powers tend to influence weaker leaders to exploit structural weaknesses in other states; especially those who already have questionable morals allowing outsiders to take control and compromise domestic values. Pakistan is no exception here, as political power is centralized in the hands of a few corrupt dynastic families: Sharif (PML-N), Bhutto-Zardari (PPP), Wali Khan (NAP), and Chaudhry (PML-Q)^{xv}. These families were tactfully selected via coercive diplomacy of global powers who shaped Pakistan's political landscape and cemented a gateway to manipulate policies to serve Western interests^{xvi}. All the while, mainstream media kindled the fire of political and tribal disunity while social media pushed sectarian differences from select scholarly voices^{xvii}, effectively diverting attention from bigger issues of systemic corruption.

On the contrary, a state built on the sovereignty of Allah incentivizes cooperation while penalizing division. Cooperation leads to strength, which protects against foreign influences and further strengthens domestic values in a virtuous cycle. Allah says:

وَأَطْيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلا تَنْزَعُوا فَتَفْشَلُوا وَتَذْهَبَ رِيحُكُم ۖ وَاصْبِرُوا ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَ الصُّبِرِين

[Al Anfāl 8:46] - And obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not quarrel with one another lest you should lose courage, and your power depart. Be steadfast, surely Allah is with those who remain steadfast.

Allah salso articulates the resulting benefits of a 'Tawhīd-centric' Islamic system.

[Al Nūr 24:55] Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that - He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them and that - He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them and that - He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, [for] they worship Me, not associating anything with Me. But whoever disbelieves after that - then those are the defiantly disobedient.

Another tactic borne from the collaboration of Western powers and dynastic leaders is the deep entrenching of the Pakistani economy through usurious loans of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, Paris Club, and other aid groups. Large loans are designed to indebt already-weakened economies by stressing the limited capacities of fiscal budgets until these states are forced to collateralize public assets and compromise on policies. The constant flow of these bailouts gladly handed to Pakistan over the decades, amassing to US\$98 billion of total external debt as of 2024^{xviii}, have successfully lined the pockets of corrupt leaders and suppressed any intent to quash *Ribā*/usury from its economy. Even when called for by its most sincere Islamic movements, Pakistan's deep reliance on a usurious global financial order makes the call to eliminate usury impotent^{xix}.

Moreover, to service the mounting debt, the government is forced to privatize state entities in the process. For example, Pakistan divested 41.5% stake in Habib Bank Limited (HBL) to raise US\$1 billion in April 2015^{xx}. There are also other reforms including reductions in subsidies and restructuring of tax systems; meant to allocate as much as 50% of federal budgets for debt repayments^{xxi} rather than empowering their citizens with progress.^{xxii} These reforms prioritize fiscal discipline and free-market policies aligned with secular ethics rather than the Islamic ideals of socio-economic justice and equity^{xxiii}. The result is a governance model that aligns more with Western economic paradigms than with Islamic principles, thereby further diluting the ideological foundation of the state^{xxiv}.

Pakistan Today

The political landscape in Pakistan largely lacks the faith and will to pursue any meaningful implementation of Islamic governance. These status quo parties can be grouped into three types:

- Firstly, those who brought into secularism from the get-go and stand for nothing but personal gains (i.e. Pakistan Muslim League N/Q, Pakistan People's Party, Muttahida Qaumi Movement, etc.)
- Secondly, those reformist parties who wish to end corruption, but use Islamic concepts as slogans and call for its implementation in piecemeal or in co-existence with the secular republic (i.e. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf)
- Thirdly, those Islamic parties who wish to implement full Islamic governance via change from within the secular systems (i.e. Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam)

With majority power in the hands of the first and second groups, implementing comprehensive Sharī'ah-based systems would require radical restructuring of the socio-political and economic landscape. With looming fears of isolation from the international community, it is no surprise that these leaders either capitulated altogether or chose to adopt a symbolic version of Islam to appease both local religious constituencies and the colonizing powers, resulting in a 'broken identity'.

Furthermore, the lack of basic Islamic knowledge in *Tawhīd (faith)*, *Fiqh (law)*, *and Akhlaq (mannerism)* amongst the general population produced a confused and divided youth. As sacred knowledge has not been passed down adequately, it has left young minds vulnerable to unislamic cultural practices of the East and the secular influences of the West. The desire for change certainly exists amongst a large portion of disenfranchised youth, however the right leadership and a comprehensive Islamic framework is essential to transform this aspiration into reality.

Current Influence of Imran Khan

The populist, Imran Khan, portrayed some keenness on creating an Islamic environment to facilitate this, however his political approach quickly turned into a few cherry-picked elements of Islam being staged on a secular model. Khan took office in August 2018 to establish a "Naya [New] Pakistan". His political agenda portrayed a reformist persona that was charismatic and contrary to what Pakistan has been used to with the patronage and entitled style from the Sharifs and Bhuttos. However, his premiership in politics soon revealed the fragility of his leadership due to the complex nature of the systemic identity crisis and Pakistan's geopolitical position.

Khan's main strategic approach in office was to combat the global rise against Islamophobia and enshrine Islamic practices across the state. Khan established a *Rahmatul-lil-Alameen Authority*, which focused on sharing the teachings of Prophet Muhmmad and implementing them nationwide to build a deeper understanding of Islam's connection to humanity^{xxv}. However, this was not enough to offset the damage inflicted from the infiltration of international politics into domestic affairs as demonstrated from the examples above.

It can also be argued that Khan did not portray a true representation of Islamic leadership either. For example, he spoke loudly against the West and other non-Muslim countries for

discriminating against Muslims in a general admonition but remained silent regarding the plight of the Uyghurs to avoid upsetting China. Or when he spoke boldly on domestic soil against the imprisonment of Aafia Siddiqui but remained quiet on the matter when in direct meetings with Donald Trump. This shows Khan's use of Islamist populism for admiration at home but lacks the courage for true revival of a wholesome Islamic sentiment^{xxvi}.

The reality is that although Khan advocated the public opinion against the current establishment, his approach of a systemic change coming from within is almost impossible. One reason could be pinned down to the literacy rates in the country. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2023, it is reported that 79.12% of the population is under 40^{xxvii} , while the literacy rate stands at $61\%^{xxviii}$. A high level of illiteracy means that the young population is easily swayed with Western propaganda of secularism, complacent to domestic corruption, and quick to attach to emotional campaigns that reiterate the Islamist populism rhetoric. During Khan's political campaign, preaching and pledging for the Prophetic way of Islam and establishing 'Riyasat-e-Madina' (Madinan State) was a primary tool. As the young population is oblivious to basic Islamic knowledge, Khan exploited this sentiment to win hearts and votes^{xxix}.

The Divine Methodology

Instead of the failed approach of 'changing the system from within', a true shift in comprehensive governance that trickles down to institutions on the ground must come from an external pressure that replaces the current structure. This is the methodology of the Prophets! The Prophets and Messengers were men with outstanding personalities chosen to bring back humanity every time it had strayed away from the original guidance of 'Tawhīd' instilled on this earth by our father, Adam. With every iteration, Allah commanded a new Prophet or Messenger to confront the existing systems and leaders and invite them to abandon their corrupt subjectivities for the just and equitable Sharī'ah. Rather than co-exist with tyranny, they began inviting towards the obedience of Allah first with words, then with the sword until one side prevailed. In other words, they delivered divine guidance to the straight path of Allah until the people judged according to the rulings of their creator*xxx. Allah reminded the Prophet Muhammad :

وَأَنزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ مُصَدِّقًا لِّمَا بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَمُهَيْمِنًا عَلَيْهِ ۖفَاحُكُم بَيْنَهُم بِمَا أَنزَلَ اللَّهُ ۖ وَلَا تَتَبِعْ أَهُوَاءَهُمْ عَمَّا جَاءَكَ مِنَ الْحَقِّ ۚ لِكُنَّ بِعَلْنَا مِنكُمْ شِرْعَةً وَمِنْهَاجًا ۚ وَلُوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَعَلُكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَلَكِن لِيَبْلُوكُمْ فِي مَا آتَاكُمْ ۖ فَاسْتَبِقُوا الْحَقَلِ مِنْ اللَّهُ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا فَيُنْبَئُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ فِيه تَخْتَلُفُونَ الْخَارُ اللَّهُ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا فَيُنْبَئُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ فِيه تَخْتَلُفُونَ الْخَارُ اللَّهُ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا فَيُنْبَئُكُم بِمَا كُنتُمْ فِيهِ تَخْتَلُفُونَ

[Al-Ma'idah 5:48] And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So, judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to

test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ.

This was a pure call of guidance with a clear demarcation of success and failure, truth and falsehood, paradise and hellfire, faith and disbelief, and it left no room for an identity crisis that we see today. Rather, it realigned humanity with a message of revival upon a consistent framework, earning the mercy of Allah for those who implemented His divine wisdom.

Concluding Thoughts

Allah [®] says:

[Al Baqarah 2:186] - And when My servants ask you, [O Muhammad], concerning Me - indeed I am near. I respond to the invocation of the supplicant when he calls upon Me. So let them respond to Me [by obedience] and believe in Me that they may be [rightly] guided.

...And perhaps Pakistan will witness positive prospects ahead. The issue of a 'broken identity' is not one that can be solved in a day, or in a year for that matter. However, given the crisis the population is currently drowning in, it is pertinent to shift our governance systems towards true justice to bring forward change for the growing youth of Pakistan. Secularism has failed our societies in the East and the West. Whereas the Islamic system is complete, wholesome, impartial, authentic, and necessary for peace among Muslims and Non-Muslims in Pakistan and around the world. So let us safeguard the generations to come from moral decay and the temptations of this fleeting world.

May Allah grant success to those working towards this aim, Ameen!

ⁱ Holyoake, G. J. (1870). English Secularism: A Confession of Belief, London: Austin & Co

- iii M. Kamal, H (2015). Understanding the Sharī ah and Its Place in the Muslim Communities: A Muslim-Malaysian Perspective
- iv Amjad, Junaid. 2022. *The Question of Pakistan's National Identity: A Study of Islamist and Secularist Narratives*. PhD diss., Western Sydney University. https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/object/uws%3A70151
- v https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2023/03/13/no-law-but-gods-law-islam-and-the-pakistani-legal-system/#:~:text=However%2C%20it%20was%20President%20Zia,(Art%20203C(2)).
- vi https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ips-islamabad_maximising-Zakāts-impact-on-economy-the-activity-7168114662994132993-PxtI/?utm_source
- vii World Bank. Macro Poverty Outlook for Pakistan: October 2024 (English). Macro Poverty Outlook (MPO) Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099712010152440272
- viii Shan, Ali & Waris, Muhammad & Basit, Abdul. (2016). Islamization in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis of Zias Regime. Global Regional Review. I. 260-270. 10.31703/grr.2016(I-I).20.
- ix **Note:** "Hudood Ordinance was an effort towards Islamic System of Justice and it was the first time in Pakistan' history that such laws were implemented. Hudood Ordinance as it said was according to Quran and Sunnah and its punishments are according to Islamic teachings. It was implemented on drinking liquor, adultery, Theft and Qadhf and if the Hadd imposed the punishment of lashes, death sentence by stoning could be given." [Source: Shan, Ali & Waris, Muhammad & Basir, Abdul (2016)]
- ^x Shan, Ali & Waris, Muhammad & Basit, Abdul. (2016). Islamization in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis of Zias Regime. Global Regional Review. I. 260-270. 10.31703/grr.2016(I-I).20.
- $\frac{xi}{https://web.archive.org/web/20091010050756/http:/pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf} \\$
- xii https://www.dawn.com/news/1844542
- xiii Ahmed, I. (2013). *Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947–2011*. Oxford University Press.
- xiv Nasr, V. (2001). *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. Oxford University Press. Ayoob, M. (2008). *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*. University of Michigan Press.
- xv Amanullah, & Faqir, K. (2023). Impact of Dynastic Politics on Democracy in Pakistan. Journal of Positive School Psychology, 7(1), 1788-1797. https://mail.journalppw.com/index.php/jpsp/article/download/17055/10796/21527
- xvi Haqqani, H. (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pg. 211.
- xvii Examples of social media feuds include Sahil Adeem vs. traditional madrasah-educated scholars, Engineer Muhammad Ali Mirza vs. Mufti Tariq Masud/Hanif Qureshi/etc., Maulana Ilyas Ghumman vs. Ilyas Qadri Barelvi, Javed Ahmed Ghamdi vs. Hafiz Muhammad Zubair, and many more.

ii Lisan al Arab 8/175. Jamal al Din Ibn Manzur (d. 711 AH). Publisher: Dār Sādir Beirut.

xviii Pakistan's External Debt and Liabilities – Outstanding. Source: Economic Affairs Division, Banks and State Bank of Pakistan. https://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/pakdebt.pdf

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